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NOTES
Administrative Law-Private Search and Seizure
In Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC,' the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that the fourth amendment precludes admission, in a Federal
Trade Commission proceeding, of records stolen by a private individual.
In 1962 the Commission filed a complaint charging Knoll, a furni-
ture manufacturer, with price discrimination in violation of section 2 (a)
of the Clayton Act.2 At the hearing, Knoll objected to the introduction
of certain company records stolen by a former employee, Herbert Prosser.
The objection was overruled3 and a cease and desist order subsequently
issued. The court of appeals reversed and remanded to the Commis-
sion with instructions to disregard the evidence in question.4
The court of appeals decided that the undisputed evidence showed
Prosser had stolen the records to aid the FTC and that therefore the
records were inadmissible under Gambino v. United States." In that
case, evidence unconstitutionally seized by state police and given to fed-
eral officials was held inadmissible in the ensuing federal trial on the
ground that the state police had procured the evidence for the purpose
of aiding the United States.
There is some question whether Gambino is proper authority for
the exclusion of records stolen by a private individual. Gambino was
decided after Weeks v. United States,' but before Elkins v. United
States.7 Weeks made the exclusionary rule applicable in federal trials
to evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment by federal offi-
'397 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1968).
'15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964), formerly ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
'Knoll Assoc., Inc., [1963-65 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,881, at
21,911 (FTC 1964).
' 397 F.2d at 537. The court thus applied the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule to an administrative proceeding. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,
380 U.S. 693 (1965), held that the exclusionary rule was applicable to a forfeiture
proceeding because the proceeding's punitive characteristics made it quasi-criminal,
thus justifying the use of constitutional safeguards. Arguably, FTC proceedings
are sufficiently criminal to warrant application of the exclusionary rule. Jones v.
Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 298 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1936), notes that the ever
expanding administrative agencies cannot be permitted to encroach on the funda-
mental rights of individuals. These two cases would seem to support, if not
require, administrative application of the exclusionary rule.
275 U.S. 310 (1927).
6232 U.S. 383 (1914).
'364 U.S. 206 (1960).
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cials. It did not apply to the fruits of state officials' unconstitutional
activity. As a result, state officers often violated the fourth amendment,
giving the resultant evidence to their federal counterparts for use in a
federal prosecution.' To counter this practice,9 the Supreme Court, in
Gambino, extended the exclusionary rule in federal trials to encompass
evidence unconstitutionally obtained through state illegality whenever that
illegality had been perpetrated for the purpose of aiding the United States.
Elkins ended the need for the Gambino rule, for the Court held that all
evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment by state or fed-
eral officials was inadmissible in a federal trial.1"
Thus, the Gambino exclusionary rule was merely an interim device
designed to curb the "silver platter" practice. Formulated to control
state officials, its application was limited to their activity and it has now
been superseded. It would seem that Gambino's test of whether an illegal
act was committed for the purpose of aiding the United States is irrel-
evant when private conduct is in issue.
The law of search and seizure as related to the acts of private indi-
viduals appears more properly controlled by Burdeau v. McDowell."
In that case, private detectives stole records later turned over to the
United States for use in a criminal prosecution. The Court flatly stated
that the fourth amendment did not apply to individual conduct and held
that since no connection was shown between the Government and the
perpetrators of the illegality, the records were admissible. Thus, the de-
cision seems to be that private illegality will be excluded only when the
Government is somehow involved in the wrongdoing.
In Knoll, the court of appeals treated Burdeau in a summary fashion.
The court felt that Prosser's calls to the FTC and his subsequent testi-
mony at the hearing clearly showed governmental involvement in the
illegality. This is an arguable finding. In every case in which the Gov-
ernment uses evidence obtained by private individuals there will be in-
volvement of the type noted by the Knoll Court, if only to enable the
evidence to change hands. Burdeau would logically seem to require gov-
'This practice later became known as the "silver platter" doctrine. Lustig v.
United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949).
'An earlier case, Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927), attempted
to curtail this same practice by excluding the evidence when state and federal
officials had acted jointly.
10 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), superseded Elkins in holding that the
exclusionary rule prohibited the use in state oir federal court of evidence seized
in violation of the fourth amendment by state or federal officials.
11256 U.S. 465 (1921).
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ernmental involvement in the planning or execution of the illegality,
rather than mere contact with the donor of the evidence, in order to
justify exclusion. Under this interpretation of Burdeau's requirement
of governmental action, and on the facts of Knoll, the stolen records would
be admissible as being the fruits of private illegality. When Prosser
first contacted the FTC lawyers, he told them he had been getting a
"raw deal [from Knoll]" and that he had "enough papers to hang
Knoll.""2 This seems to indicate that Prosser had decided to steal, and
possibly had already stolen, the papers before he contacted the Commis-
sion and leads to the conclusion that the Government was not "involved"
in any meaningful sense of the word.
Why should the Seventh Circuit use such an indiscriminate test for
Governmental involvement? This mistreatment of Burdeau may have
been caused by a feeling on the part of the court that the case is no
longer good law. Whether this is so is debatable. It has been urged
that Elkins v. United States has overruled Burdeau in enunciating a
general rule that federal courts may not admit evidence obtained by
state police during a search, which if conducted by federal officers, would
have been illegal.13 This view assumes that "private individuals" may be
substituted for "state police" in the above formula. However, it may be
erroneous to assume that state action and individual action are constitu-
tionally equivalent, especially since Wolf v. Colorado'4 made it clear
that at least the core of the fourth amendment controls state police
activity.' This assumption would erase all distinction between govern-
mental and non-governmental action, the distinction upon which Burdeau
is based.
This same distinction has become blurred in other areas,'" and it
has been said that this blurring process will lead to the demise of
12397 F.2d at 532.
'*See Williams v. United States, 282 F.2d 940, 941 (6th Cir. 1960)
(assumes this in dictum); Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d 40, 45, 203 N.E.2d
481, 484, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83, 87 (1964) (dissenting opinion); contra, People v. Hor-
man, 22 N.Y.2d 378, 239 N.E.2d 625, 292 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1968).14338 U.S. 25 (1949).
15 Note, Mapp v. Ohio and Exclusion of Evidence Illegally Obtained by Private
Parties, 72 YALE L.J. 1062, 1064 n.18 (1963). Although Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961), overruled Wolf, this aspect of the case should still be valid. See
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960); Irvine v. California, 347
U.S. 128, 132 (1954); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 119 (1951).
18 Notably in the civil rights area. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,
755-56 (1966); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964); Peterson v. City of
Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
U.S. 715 (1961); Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
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Burdeau.17 However, the breakdown of the distinction is not a reason
to overrule Burdeau, but merely a means to that end. By using this
breakdown in other areas as authority, the Court could remove its self-
imposed governmental action barrier and exclude the fruits of private
illegality. It should not do so unless there is a valid reason.
A valid reason for overruling Burdeau may lie in the emergent "right
of privacy" recently articulated by the Supreme Court.:. This right of
privacy, embodied in the fourth and fifth amendments, among others,
may be so strong as to compel the exclusion of the fruits of its invasion
even when the invader is a private citizen. Under this theory it would
not matter who committed the violation-whenever the government
sought to utilize its fruits the exclusionary rule would apply. This rea-
soning does not deny continued validity to the governmental action re-
quirement, but instead finds such action in the government's attempted
use of the evidence. This redefining of "governmental action" hinges
on a private individual's illegal searches and seizures being held violative
of the emergent right of privacy. The Court may be more willing to
find such private illegality a violation of this right of privacy than it
has been to find it an unadorned fourth amendment violation. As the
right of privacy expands, the chances for Burdeau's demise become more
real.
However, Linkletter v. Walker 9 may indicate that the right of pri-
vacy is not as vigorous as might have been assumed. There the Court
refused to give retroactive effect to Mapp v. Ohio20 because, it reiterated,
the policy of the exclusionary rule is to deter police illegality and no
deterrence would be brought about by release of those already imprisoned.
Thus, the espousal of a pure deterrence rational seems to imply that the
right of privacy is a concept of limited usefulness, for an ever expand-
ing constitutional right of privacy would seemingly have demanded retro-
activity for Mapp in order that the transgressed privacy of those
imprisoned be vindicated.
Thus, it would appear that Burdeau has continued validity, at least
until the extent of the right of privacy is more fully articulated." In
" Comment, The Exclusion of Evidence Wrongfuly Obtained by Private Indi-
viduals, 1966 UTAH L. REv. 271, 274.
8See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) ; Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).10381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965).
20367 U.S. 643 (1961).
" See United States v. American Rad. & Stand. Sanit. Corp., 278 F. Supp.
241 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
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the final analysis, the Knoll court seemed to sense this, as shown by its
attempt to distinguish Burdeau; in reality it based its decision not on
Ganbino but on the idea that judicial integrity and the concept of an
ordered society would be jeopardized were the courts to sanction
governmental illegality by permitting the use of unconstitutionally ob-
tained evidence.2" Though disfavoring Burdeau, the court of ap-
peals seemed to realize that there is no present ground for overruling
that case. By distinguishing rather than disturbing, the court has avoided
direct confrontation with a Supreme Court precedent and, at the same
time, has undermined that precedent, for to distinguish a case which
seems clearly controlling does little to strengthen it as precedent.
W. LUNSFORD LONG
Civil Procedure-Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(d)-
Disposition of Cases by the Court of Appeals after Granting
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
In the recent case of Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co.,1 the
Supreme Court attempted to clarify the procedure involved in using the
judgment notwithstanding the verdict2 at the appellate level in the fed-
eral system3 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(d).4 Neely was
a diversity action in which the jury awarded plaintiff damages in her
wrongful death action against defendant. After the verdict was returned,
defendant moved under Rule 50(b) for judgment n.o.v., or in the alter-
native, for a new trial. The trial judge denied both motions and ordered
judgment entered for plaintiff on the verdict. On appeal, the court of
appeals ruled that the evidence was legally insufficient to go to the jury
on the issue of negligence and ordered judgment n.o.v. for defendant.
Then, instead of remanding the case to the trial court for new trial
" Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960), notes that the courts
ought not to be a party to illegality by permitting the Government to use evidence
in violation of the Constitution.
1386 U.S. 317 (1967). This case has also been noted in The Supreme Court,
1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 218 (1967).
'Hereinafter referred to as judgment n.o.v.
' For a general treatment of the practice and procedure in the federal system
under Federal Rule 50, see F. JAmES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.22 (1965); 5 J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 50.01-.17 (2d ed. P. Kurland recomp. 1966) [here-
inafter cited as MOORE]; Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 449 (1960).
' FED. R. Civ. P. 50(d). See note 22 infra.
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